Dispute Resolution

A constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has dealt with questions pertaining to the constitutionality of Part XIV of the Finance Act, 2017 and the Rules framed thereunder.

On 15 November 2019, a three judge bench of the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in the much-anticipated matter of Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors., Civil Appeal No. 8766-67 of 2019. The Supreme Court heard appeals against the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal’s (“NCLAT”) judgment dated 04 July 2019 (“Judgment”). The Supreme Court also heard challenges to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act 2019 (“2019 Amendment”) which has introduced key amendments to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (“Code”).

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (Supreme Court), vide its recent judgment of Vinubhai Haribhai and Others v The State of Gujarat and Another dated 16 October 2019, (Vinubhai Case) arising out of a criminal appeal against an order of the High Court of Gujarat (High Court), has held that a judicial magistrate has wide powers under Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1) and Section 2(h) read with Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to direct further investigation, upon an application or suo moto, even at post-cognizance stage bef

Section 14 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code 2016 (as amended) (IBC) imposes a moratorium on the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against a corporate debtor undergoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the IBC.

The High Court of Bombay (Bombay High Court) in its recent decision in Rata Tata and Ors. v State of Maharashtra and Anr. (Criminal Writ Petition No. 1238 of 2019 decided on 22 July 2019) held that the contents of the special notice issued by a shareholder, whilst requisitioning an extra-ordinary general meeting for removal of a director, was not per se defamatory, as the shareholder was exercising its statutory rights.

Recently, a division bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court (Supreme Court) comprising Justices R. Banumathi and A.S. Bopanna, in the case of Brahmani River Pellets Ltd v Kamachi Industries Ltd (Civil Appeal No. 5850 of 2019), examined the question of whether an arbitration agreement between two Indian parties, expressly stating the ‘venue’ of the arbitration, amounted to an exclusive jurisdiction clause for disputes under the agreement.

In the past few decades, with international trade and commerce on a rise, there has been a significant increase in commercial disputes amongst parties from different states. These transboundary disputes have led to the growth and evolution of the international legal regime.

Issues surrounding exclusive jurisdiction clauses have come up before Courts, time and again. Common questions that often arises in context of exclusive jurisdiction clauses include inter alia those pertaining to (i) the validity of such a clause in light of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 (Contract Act) , (ii) the effect of such a clause on the writ jurisdiction of a High Court and (iii) the extent of the exclusivity of such exclusive jurisdiction clauses?

The question that arose before the Supreme Court in the appeal in Garware Wall Ropes Ltd vs Coastal Marine Constructions & Engineering Ltd, Civil Appeal No 3631 of 2019 (present case) was whether the earlier judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of SMS Teas Estates (P) Ltd Vs Chandmari Tea Co (P) Ltd, (2011) 14 SCC 66 (SMS Teas Estates) would continue to apply to  the introduction of Section 11 (6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (1996 Act), by way of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015 (2015 Act).